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Empresas brasileiras: a difícil adaptação à globalização
Virgílio CaixEta arraEs*
Introduction
The internationalization of production is when citizens of a certain country 
have access to goods and services of foreign origin. There are three ways that 
this situation can occur: commerce, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and 
contractual relationships. 
Foreign Direct Investment is characterized by the movement of a legally 
registered body (e.g. a business or corporation) – beyond its customary frontier 
in order to perform an activity through which that body can exercise the total or 
partial control of a productive unit – branch, subsidiary or joint venture. 
The need for a commercial presence via FDI is not always required for 
internationalization to occur due to the segmentation of specific services such 
as engineering or medicine. In these two examples, there occurs a temporary 
transposition of highly qualified labor. 
Another example of internationalization can be highlighted by means of 
consumer intermediaries, such as in the tourism, education and health sectors. 
Likewise, it is possible to consolidate the business activity of producers and 
consumers in different markets originating from two locations. A hypothetical 
example would be when a British tourist is lodged at a hotel belonging to a 
French chain in Brazilian territory (Gonçalves 2002, 24-5).
With the end of the Cold War, the 1990s saw the elimination of most of the 
practices utilized by countries to limit the presence of foreign capital, irrespective 
of the means – portfolio or foreign direct investment. 
In the case of peripheral or developing countries, the justification for the 
validity of a specific degree of protectionism within its legal regulations was to 
stimulate the generation and development of endogenous technology. 
The main objective was to gradually replace industrial imports, an important 
step that was considered essential to overcome underdevelopment, in accordance 
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with the existing beliefs at that time expressed by the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and to reduce extreme social 
inequality. 
In the last decade of the 20th century, international organizations such as 
the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) began 
to develop a response that was very different from the thinking of ECLAC and 
which would severely affect the role of the State in the promotion of a more 
egalitarian form of growth from a social point of view. 
Among numerous recommended measures, the need became apparent to 
structure a very different institutional environment from the existing one or from 
that of national developmentalism as found in parts of Latin America and in 
social-democratic countries in Europe.
It was felt that the Brazilian State should alter its practices of intervening in 
the productive sector and should thereby restrict its administration to the provision 
of health services, education and basic infrastructure. Thus, governments should 
privatize their corporations or provide concessions for the exploitation of specific 
services, even in the cases of natural monopolies such as the water and energy 
sectors, for instance. 
The State should also concurrently modify tax laws, and even go so far as 
modify constitutional legislation if necessary. The objectives of these modifications 
would be to attract more FDI, reinforce the right to property, ensure the 
permanence of specific contracts (especially those established with global 
organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and financial 
institutions like creditor banks), consolidate fiscal discipline and establish the 
liberalization of basic interest and exchange rates. 
Thus, these recommendations made up the ideology of liberal-developmen-
talism and took precedence over the idea that the international system was 
composed of countries at different stages of development.
As a consequence of the supposed universality of such procedures, their 
definitive adoption would lead to bringing about effects in various countries that 
would be manifested in countless forms of instability: political, economic and 
even cultural.
The economic crises between 1994 and 2002 initially had global dimensions 
in Mexico, Russia, Asia (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea), etc. 
until they arrived in Argentina and Brazil. 
Despite the undeniable record of negative side-effects of liberal developmen-
talism in Latin America, there was no program structure available that could 
oppose it in a long-term and consistent manner.
Brazil: the transformation
The first neoliberal reforms were implemented undramatically in Brazil at 
the beginning of the term of office of President Jose Sarney (1985-1990), who 
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belonged to the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Along with the 
application of the Cruzado Plan in 1986, the main purpose of which was to tame 
the exorbitant inflation of the time, the Government changed the law to begin 
the complete privatization of some existing state-owned enterprises. However, 
the sale of these corporations was in practice restricted to Brazilian investors. 
In 1988, the Government instituted the Federal Program for Denationalization 
to lower the growing public deficit, thereby fostering the deregulation of the 
economy and moving public service utilities into the private sector. Later, foreign 
capital was encouraged to purchase these government-owned corporations. 
From 1990, the next President, Fernando Collor de Mello, of the Brazilian 
Reconstruction Party (PRN), expanded the openness of the Brazilian economy as 
well the Brazilian Plan for Denationalization. 
One of its most important aspects was that foreign capital could carry 40% 
of state enterprise common stock or 100% of the preferred stock. 
Interrupted by an impeachment process in December 1992, Collor’s term 
signified the substitution of the national-development model by the liberal-
development one. Collor’s replacement, Itamar Franco, of the PRN party, slowed 
down the rate of the privatizations of state-owned corporations. 
Through the implementation of a national decree, Franco decided that 
the State pension funds could no longer be part of the Privatization Program. 
Besides, he stated that the presidency could limit the use of junk bonds (public 
debt titles) in the privatization process. 
Towards the end of Franco’s administration in the last quarter of 1994, 
import quotas were also reduced for hundreds of products, which negatively 
affected the balance of trade.
During the two terms of office of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-2002) of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), there was a 
continuation of the process of economic openness and as well as of privatization. 
At that point, the US Government debated setting up a continental free trade 
zone that would be called the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), similar 
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) free trade agreement 
already established between the United States of America, Canada and Mexico. 
The negotiation agenda of the 34 countries in the Americas discussed the need 
to liberalize the trade of goods and to introduce common legislation for matters 
related to services, intellectual property, investments, subsidies, safeguards, etc. 
However, the negotiations did not include the possibility of a monetary 
union or the formation of a common central bank – the dollar currency would 
be progressively adopted as in Ecuador (2000) and El Salvador (2001). Labor and 
environmental questions did not form the central part of the diplomatic debates. 
During that time, the Cardoso Government was dedicated to consolidating 
its performance in agribusinesses such as orange juice, coffee, meat, sugar, soybeans, 
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such as textiles and shoe production, bearing in mind the impossibility of competing 
with the United States, Canadian and even Mexican industry. 
Brazil elected to support two basic factors: cheap labor and the vast natural 
resources of its ores, fertile lands and hydrographic basins. 
Despite the rhetoric of extreme liberalization and Brazilian political 
goodwill, the White House tried to shift the discussion on agricultural products 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reduce the accessibility of its own 
market to Brazilian, Argentine and Colombian competitors, amongst others. 
The deadline for the establishment of this bloc would be 2005. All the 
countries in the region would be part of it, except Cuba. Between 2001 and 2003, 
a 350-page memorandum divided into 10 chapters was produced. However, due 
to the terrorist attack of September 2001, the priority of US foreign policy would 
be greatly altered for the next few years.
Even so, the Unites States relaxed its position towards the free trade area of 
Americas. In its portfolio of investments, the American government defended 
the end of policies favorable to national enterprises and open up to foreign ones, 
even if they were compensatory. In practice, the hypothetical FTAA would give 
egalitarian treatment to all members, since tariffs would be swiftly eliminated. 
Thus, giving preferential treatment to internally produced goods could not 
happen. In addition, any type of restriction related to the sale of specific goods 
would not exist to Member States, as happens in special export zones in countries 
like Brazil and China. 
The investor would have formal permission to carry out at any time the 
remittance of profits, repatriation of capital and assets and even receipt of interest 
and would not be obliged to establish agreements concerning technology transfer. 
The investors would profit from a higher status when appealing to international 
arbitration, thereby rising above the legislation of each Member State.
It has been shown that the regional political and economic environment was 
very unfavorable to the performance of Brazilian business. This environment was 
incapable of linking up with the equivalent North American one from a financial 
and technological point of view. In this context Government stimulation policy 
to specific sectors would be abolished. 
Since the beginning of the millennium therefore, Brazil has begun to focus 
on a presumed agricultural advantage (considered natural from the neoliberal 
point of view) when offering advantages in its diplomatic negotiations with the 
United States and the European Union in the areas of intellectual property, foreign 
investments, and industrial services and goods. (Nogueira Batista, 2003, 267-277).
In January 2003, the Brazilian Labor Party (PT) defeated the ruling Brazilian 
Social Democratic Party (PSDB), after two four-year terms, from January 1995 to 
December 2002. When handing the presidential sash to Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso also left the economy in a fragile state, with high 
inflation and a basic interest rate of 25% per year (source: Banco Central do Brasil). 
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In order to deal with results of this turbulent heritage the Brazilian 
administration chose to maintain economic orthodoxy (discipline) running the 
risk of aggravating the negative effects even more in the short-term. Thus, the 
establishment of an initial partnership with the financial sector was justified. 
One of the greatest symbolic measures of the PT leadership was the decision 
to appoint Henrique Meireles as Head of the Central Bank. He had previously 
occupied a high-level post of one of the largest US banks, FleetBoston Financial 
in the 1990s. After retiring from FleetBoston Financial, he was elected Federal 
Congressman for the PSDB but he did not even take office in the National 
Congress because he was asked to direct the Brazilian Central Bank.
With the presence of Henrique Meireles, President Luis Inácio Lula da 
Silva’s administration assured the fulfillment of all commitments established by 
the preceding government, as shown by its enthusiastic adoption of neoliberalism. 
For this reason, during the first few months political renovation would not extend 
to other areas. 
Starting from President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s very first day in charge, 
the Brazilian government’s posture was to maintain the system of inflation goals 
set by the National Monetary Council and to preserve a primary surplus with the 
objective of keeping the due date payment of debt interest to avoid a catastrophic 
internal domestic debt default. However, the exchange rate of Brazil’s currency 
would continue to fluctuate. 
In this government’s eight years of administration, inflation was curbed. 
National economic growth was modest compared to countries such as China 
and India, despite the world economy profiting from favorable winds until the 
US crisis in 2008. Between 2002 and 2008, China maintained growth rates 
ranging from 9% to 13% and India from 7.1% to 9.7% (with the exception of 
2002 when India only managed 3.8% economic growth) – Superintendência de 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Globalization: the difficulty of internationalizing Brazilian business
The spread of the globalization process was highlighted after the Cold War 
with the formation or consolidation of economic blocs, greater circulation of 
foreign direct investment and regional or world tariff reductions through the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) and later its successor, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).
In this new international economic configuration, Brazil did not know how 
to properly take advantage of the available opportunities, as is seen from the 
table above. From the beginning of 1997 to the end of 1999, Brazil was able to 
finance the major part of its current account deficit thanks to the arrival of US$ 
100 billion from FDI. One of the consequences for local industry was to adapt to 
new patterns of production. Without these new patterns, it would have not been 
possible to create internal competition (Correa de Lacerda, 2007: 19). 
On the other hand, modernization allowed Brazil to plunge into the 
international market in a more flexible manner, despite its interest rates, which 
are among the highest on the planet – over 10% per year. 
Basically, there are two prejudicial effects to national business related to such 
high interest rates: the difficulty of raising capital, thus hampering the decision-
making process and the expansion of activities, and the over-valuing of the local 
currency that prevents the increase of exports, especially in the industrial sector. 
Well-established traditional sectors of Brazilian industry such as textiles and 
shoe production have suffered due to the over-valued currency. Even the sectors 
that were relatively advanced in terms of technology, such as the automobile or 
chemical industries, have not been able to compete. 
In this situation there has been a replacement of internal production by 
international subsidiaries in the Brazilian territory, by imports. As a consequence, 
there has been a reduction of FDI and the absorption of technology in different 
chains of production was disrupted after decades of existence. 
From a social point of view, this shift leads to negative consequences, 
thereby causing an increase of unemployment and reduction of income that 
can be temporarily cushioned by state interventions through the concession 
of unemployment benefits and family stipends as part of a government welfare 
program. 
The entrepreneurial sector increasingly complains about the tax quotas 
applied to export products that consequently reduce competitiveness in various 
markets, especially those in developing countries. 
Because of this, Brazil finds itself in a difficult situation, because in order to 
achieve continuous development without significant fluctuations it would have 
to increase its exports in order to gain access to capital goods and eventually to 
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At the same time the country has to maintain its primary surplus, which 
would have a favorable result in the commercial sector, targeting the need to 
compensate for the deficit in the balance of services – interest on foreign debt, 
remittance of profits and dividends, and the payment of royalties and licenses. 
There is an additional difficulty to the whole scenario: the reiteration of 
an agro-export model which drives the country’s foreign policy in the largest 
international forums. For this reason we have seen the constitution of the G-20 
and Brazil’s participation in the Cairns Group. According to Veiga 2005:
It is widely known that Brazil, as a major exporter of agricultural and 
agro-industrial goods, has adopted an offensive stance in negotiations on the 
liberalization of trade in agriculture taking place in the WTO, as well as in 
other negotiating processes (...) in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
and EU-Mercosur negotiations, Brazil has presented proposals consistent with 
those developed in the multilateral arena. However, in the months preceding 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003, an interesting 
process of strategy-shifting took place, involving Brazil’s stance in negotiations 
on agriculture (…) Without breaking with the Cairns Group and giving up its 
pro-trade liberalization stance in agricultural negotiations, Brazil led the setting 
of an issue-based developing countries’ coalition aimed at bargaining jointly 
during the Ministerial Conference and beyond. This new coalition, the G20, 
brought together developing countries which traditionally adopted differing – 
even opposed – positions in the agricultural negotiations in the WTO.
According to the data shown below, it is possible to note the growing amount  
of primary products exported, which has significantly advanced in 10 years,  
to the detriment of manufactured products.



































































































































































































































Source:Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro 2010 
Brazil occupied the 24th place in the classificatory framework of exporting 
countries in 2009, being responsible for 1.2% of the world total. This performance 
is considered inefficient, notably when compared to other countries such as South 
Korea at 2.9%, Mexico at 1.8%, Russia at 2.4%, and, China at 9.6%, the latter 
overtaking Germany (Balança Comercial Brasileira, 2010). 
The number of national exporting companies in 2009 was 19,823 – the 
lowest level since 2004, when Brazilian exporters numbered 21,925. It is worth 
mentioning that the US crisis of 2008 contributed to this shortfall. 
The framework below features the performance distribution of Brazilian 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Soybeans and their by-products, oil and fuel, ores, meats, sugar and ethanol, 
coffee and its by-products, and tobacco and its by-products are examples of the 
15 most widely exported products in recent years.
Throughout President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration the benefit 
has been observed of the rise of commodity prices due to the growth of Chinese 
industry. In a certain way, China’s growing demand has compensated for the 
over-valuing of the Brazilian currency, the real, up to 2008. 
Brazil reinforced its condition as a commodity producer, both in President 
Cardoso’s administration as well as in that of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, not 
allowing consistent reduction of its external vulnerability in order to tie its 
production to the needs of consumption in other countries, especially the United 
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CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL
Brazilian Capital Overseas 
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Source: Banco Central do Brasil 2009. 
In general terms, the capacity of a company to resist problems in the world 
economy indicates its possible degree of external vulnerability. This capacity is 
measured in two different ways:
Governments’ response options are found in their own economic policies. 
The greater the number of response options available, the less is their vulnerability. 
The higher the costs are, the greater is their exposure level, and therefore their 
vulnerability. The costs of a possible crisis might be seen in the form of a recession 
or depression.
It should be emphasized that external vulnerability is always present in 
the situation of all former colonies, which are incapable of overcoming alone 
the misfortune inherited from their old metropolises (Gonçalves, 1998: 157-8). 
Thus, one of the greatest economic challenges for Brazil is to overcome this 
situation. 
Internationalization and insertion: the difficulty
One of the ways to reduce vulnerability would be continuous investment 
in technological enhancement, infrastructure development, and qualification of 
labor, thus allowing productivity to rise and guaranteeing the conditions necessary 
to compete fairly in global markets. 
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Since the beginning of the 1990s Brazilian firms have been exposed to the 
patterns of international competitiveness as customs and non-customs barriers 
have been gradually eliminated. 
During this time, it has been found that many of these firms were not 
capable of entering the global market insertion because of their technological 
and managerial backwardness when compared to the similar ones of the North 
Atlantic axis and China. 
Two basic means of renovation would ensure the country’s international 
presence: exports (considering the abundance of raw materials and low labor costs) 
and foreign direct investments, when profiting from sophisticated technology, 
highly qualified labor, the country’s own financial resources or the capacity of 
obtaining them, and from a trademark or a special product. 
The objective of FDI is to assure the reduction of production costs that 
can be obtained through easy access to raw materials, infrastructure expansion, 
political regime, size of consumer market, and the possibility of joint ventures 
with local businesses. 
How can Brazil become more visible in the next 20 years? First, compared 
to the Unites States, Germany, China, France or Great Britain, Brazil would 
have a specific advantage more concentrated in access to raw materials than in 
terms of methods of production and technology generation and more efficient 
commercialization. 
In theory, exports could precede FDI when first verifying the acceptability 
of a specific product in a market. Its incorporation to the consumption patterns 
of another country could stimulate its production on a larger scale. However, in 
practice, Brazil has not achieved any desired success in this sense. 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), in 2008 Brazil had only three business among the 100 largest in 
developing countries in terms of foreign assets (not taking into consideration 
financial corporations): Vale1 (do Rio Doce), was in ninth place in the area of 
mining and quarrying; Petrobras, was in 16th place in the area of the exploitation, 
refining and distribution of oil and gas; Gerdau, in 18th place in the sector of 
metallurgy. None of them is included among the world’s 100 biggest companies. 
Compared with other countries in Latin America, Mexico had four of 
the region’s 100 largest companies, Cemex, in third place in the mining sector; 
Argentina, only one: Temium, in metalworking; Venezuela, only one: PDVSA, in 
the area of petroleum. Mexico was the only country which had one firm among 
the planet’s 100 largest companies.
Brazilian corporations were responsible for receiving 34% of Latin 
America’s FDI in 2007. The main reason for this is the country’s geographical, 
1  Since November 2007, the corporation has withdrawn the name ‘Vale do Rio Doce’ in favor of the new 
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cultural and political proximity to the Southern Common Market in South 
America (MERCOSUR). It is worth mentioning that the foreign policy of 
President Luis Inácio da Silva’s administration has been much more enthusiastic 
about a closer relationship with the continent than the preceding administration. 
The company with the greatest presence in Latin America was Gerdau, 
with purchases in Mexico and Venezuela. However, up to 2007, Petrobras was 
considered the most geographically diversified corporation with branches in almost 
21 countries, followed by Gerdau and Vale, both with 18 foreign subsidiaries.
Among the 10 largest Brazilian enterprises throughout the world, Norberto 
Odebrecht, (construction), Perdigão (food), and Stefanini IT (computer sciences 
consultancy) were established in 14 countries. Sadia (food) and Camargo Corrêa 
(construction) were in 13 countries. Randon, (automobiles), and Andrade Gutierrez 
(construction), were in 12 and 11 countries respectively. (Fundação Dom Cabral, 
2008: 11-2).
In 2009, there was a change in this situation: Vale became the major 
Brazilian conglomerate in international terms, with branches in 33 countries, 
followed by Petrobras, in 26 countries, and the Banco do Brasil in 23 countries.
Completing the list of the 10 biggest national firms abroad, we have 
Votorantim, a conglomerate in the capital goods sector, in 21 countries, Weg 
in the area of automation and Brasil Foods in 20 countries, Odebrecht in 16 
countries, Stefanini IT in 10 countries and finally Camargo Corrêa and Gerdau 
in 14 countries.
Brazilian transnational corporations continue to favor Latin America in 
terms of investment (Fundação Dom Cabral 2010: 10-1). 
Conclusion
At the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil joined the neoliberal democratic circle, 
after the direct election of Fernando Collor de Mello. From them on, Brazil’s 
economic insertion in the international context has been gradually based on a 
process of ‘reprimarization’, to use the term coined by the economist Reinaldo 
Gonçalves (Durão, 2007). 
Foreign policy has been employed with the objective of reinforcing the 
country’s agro-exporting character, in accordance with the activities of Itamaraty 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in multilateral forums such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), G-20 and the unsuccessful one of the Free Trade Areas of 
the America (FTAA).
Internally, the support base of this model has been supplied by the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES). Through its budget, the government has financed 
many mergers, with the justification of better stimulating its international 
participation in specific sectors, almost all of them concentrated in agricultural 
and extractive activities. 
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In practice, the government has centered its strength in the sector of 
commodities, precisely the one that is most subject to global price variations. 
The process of ‘reprimarization’ has negative impacts on the environment 
because of the possibility of predatory exploitation of natural resources, as well 
of contributing to generating employment abroad and to the reduction of in-
country investments. 
On the other hand, the internationalization of businesses aids managerial 
and technological enhancement through partnerships with foreign corporations. 
In addition, this process can help reduce a possible instability in the balance 
of payments through acquiring the remittance of profits in a strong currency, and 
dilute research and development costs consequent on dissemination into diverse 
markets. 
An option for the next government, whose change in administration is 
scheduled to take place in October 2010, is reinforcing the process of internalization 
of Brazilian firms through the constitution of a specific organization similar to 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) established by the US 
government in 1971. 
With the establishment of a specific corporation, a specialized bureaucracy 
would be instituted, separate from functional body of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Brazilian Development Bank. 
An organization aiming at the internationalization of Brazilian enterprises 
would assist in obtaining credit with more reasonable interest rates and due dates, 
and contribute to the debate on tax reform – the Brazilian system is based on 
cumulative taxation, based on the invoice and gross income – and on the need to 
improve and enlarge the national infrastructure. 
Even large corporations fear to apply for international loans because of 
the volatility of exchange rates these days; the Brazilian real is over-valued when 
compared to the US dollar. 
Thus, Brazil enjoys the necessary conditions to better internationalize its 
production due to the richness of its natural resources, advanced technology in 
various segments and a well-qualified labor market. However, the country cannot 
bring all these elements together so as to broaden its participation in the world 
market in a long-lasting and consistent way. 
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Abstract
The article deals with the internationalization of Brazilian businesses in the current decade. In 
the 1990s, Brazil embraced economic neoliberalism and promoted a huge opening up of its 
economy. At that time, Brazilian companies had to adapt rapidly. Twenty years later, the country 
has reinforced its presence in Latin America and has ensured a better position in the global 
markets, especially by through agricultural exports. 
Resumo
O artigo trata da internacionalização das empresas brasileiras na presente década. Nos anos 
90, o Brasil adotou o neoliberalismo e promoveu uma ampla abertura da economia. Naquele 
período, as empresas nacionais tiveram de adaptar-se em pouco tempo. Vinte anos depois, o 
país reforçou sua presença na América Latina e assegurou uma posição melhor nos mercados 
globais, especialmente por meio da agroexportação.
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